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We propose a model where imperfect matching between firms and workers on local labor 
markets  leads  to  incentives  for  spatial  agglomeration.  We  show  that  the  occurrence  of 
spatial agglomeration depends on initial size differences in terms of both number of workers 
and firms. Allowing for dynamics of workers' and firms' location choices, we show that the 
spatial outcome depends crucially on different dimensions of agents' mobility. The effect of 
a higher level of human capital on regional disparities depends on whether it makes workers 
more mobile or more specialized on the labor market. 
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Economic geography models which attempt to explain the spatial distribution of economic
activity through the interaction of diﬀerent economic agents are now part of our stock of
knowledge. The explanations provided by these theoretical models include, among others,
those which combine transport costs with economies of scale (see Fujita et al., 1999). However,
empirical investigations such as those undertaken by Dumais et al. (1997) and Rosenthal and
Strange (2004), show that labor pooling is one of the main reasons for agglomeration. These
empirical ﬁndings furnish support for the following insightful observation related to human
capital and spatial agglomeration made by Marshall (1920): “Employers are apt to resort to
any place where they are likely to ﬁnd a good choice of workers with the special skills they
require; while men seeking employment naturally go to places where there are many employers
who need such skills as theirs”.
Certain authors have dealt with the question of human capital’s importance in the spatial
distribution of workers and ﬁrms (see below). But this important issue also has other facets
which need to be explored further. An analysis of the impact of human capital on the spatial
distribution of economic activity has to speciﬁcally take into account the role played by its
main characteristics. Workers’ skills can be general (determining the productivity for the task
they perfectly match) and speciﬁc (determining the mobility between tasks). The speciﬁcity
of human capital engenders imperfect matching between ﬁrms and workers. In addition, the
interactions between ﬁrms and workers on labor markets are spatially localized. The combina-
tion of imperfect matching and geographically localized interactions confers oligopsonic power
to ﬁrms. This has a signiﬁcant impact on location decisions of economic agents through its
eﬀects on wages. A priori, a change in the level of human capital can lead either to a lower,
or a higher mobility of workers between tasks. The former outcome would be the result if the
change leads to an increase in the level of speciﬁch u m a nc a p i t a l .T h el a t t e re ﬀect would take
place if the change leads to more general human capital.
There are a few papers closely related to the issue of human capital and location analyzed
in our paper. They either assume a given spatial conﬁguration (Hesley and Strange (1990) with
symmetric cities; Abdel-Rahman and Wang (1995) with a single metropolis within a system of
cities) or consider very particular degrees of human capital speciﬁcity (Matouschek and Robert-
2Nicoud (2004), where it is either general or completely ﬁrm speciﬁc) or else assume an exogenous
local positive human capital externality (the “brain drain” literature, Miyagiwa, 1991; Reichlin
and Rustichini 1998). Our paper contributes to this existing literature in three ways. We
develop a theoretical model which demonstrates the link between the main characteristics of
human capital and spatial location of both ﬁrms and workers. Moreover we characterize all
possible spatial equilibria (agglomeration, dispersion as well as partial agglomeration) and by
allowing for simple dynamics show the crucial importance of diﬀerent dimensions of workers’
and ﬁrms’ spatial mobility on the spatial outcome. In this way we break new ground by
endogenizing the spatial distribution of ﬁrms and workers and hence the local human capital
externalities according to the degree of human capital speciﬁcity.
The aim of our paper is two-fold: First, we provide a simple setting in which both skill and
spatial mismatch between ﬁrms and workers confer market power to employers. This market
power explains spatial agglomeration of both workers and ﬁrms, even in the absence of strategic
behavior by ﬁrms in the ﬁnal goods markets. Second, we apply our framework of analysis to
examine how certain public policies which modify the magnitude of both sources of mismatch
inﬂuence the agents’ location decisions and the resulting degree of regional disparity.
We start by identifying the forces of agglomeration and dispersion. Mobile workers have
incentives to locate themselves close to a large number of ﬁrms in order to escape the market
power of ﬁrms. But at the same time, in order to avoid urban costs, they prefer not to locate
themselves in too densely populated areas. The locational incentives of ﬁrms are diﬀerent.
Since the regional proﬁto fﬁrms increases with the number of workers in that region, ﬁrms
have an incentive to locate in densely populated areas. But at the same time, since proﬁt
decreases with competition, ﬁrms will want to locate in markets with few rivals.
We show that depending on the level of general human capital and urban costs, there exists
at most two types of stable equilibria: a dispersed equilibrium where half of each type of agents
locate in one region, and an agglomerated equilibrium where both types of agents are spatially
agglomerated. Introducing simple dynamics for both workers’ and ﬁrms’ location choices, we
identify the threshold in terms of region size diﬀerence above which regional disparities will
emerge. We show that this critical threshold depends on ﬁrms’ and workers’ spatial mobility.
We then proceed to use our framework of analysis to examine the impact of human capital
on regional disparity. Our key ﬁndings are as follows: if an increase in the level of human
3capital leads to greater mobility of workers between tasks, the economy is more likely to
converge towards the dispersed equilibrium. Indeed, greater skill mobility reduces oligopsonic
power and thereby decreases workers’ incentives to migrate towards larger regions. These
theoretical ﬁndings are empirically supported by Diamond and Simon (1990) who show that
in more specialized cities, workers demand higher wages. Moreover, following Maurel and
Sédillot (1999), our theoretical results are in accordance with the observation that industries
such as book publishing or cutlery where a highly specialized work force is needed, are spatially
concentrated.
Another result of our model is that there is a positive correlation between the size of the
market and the degree of specialization. This prediction is conﬁrmed empirically by Duranton
and Jayet (2005) who show that very specialized occupations are over-represented in large
French urban areas. While their main concern is the division of labor, our story is consistent
with their empirical results. In a sense our model complements their theoretical model. Indeed,
while they argue that specialized tasks are opened by ﬁrms in large markets only, we show that
large markets are the result of highly specialized workers induced to agglomerate in the same
area in order to avoid ﬁrms’ oligopsonic power.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. In
section 3 we analyze the equilibrium in the labor market and derive the regional wages and
proﬁts. In section 4, we analyze location decisions of agents separately and then examine how
the interaction of these decisions leads to diﬀerent spatial outcomes. Section 5 discusses how
public policies can inﬂuence regional outcomes. Section 6 concludes.
2T H E M O D E L
Workers and Firms
There are two regions, region A and region B. In each region, there are both workers and
ﬁrms. We assume that total population equals 1 and denote by αA (respectively αB =1−αA)
the share of the population of workers located in region A (respectively in region B). Each
region’s population consists of mobile and immobile workers, both endowed with the same level
of human capital h. This human capital determines a worker’s productivity.
The total number of ﬁrms is exogenous and equal to N.W e d e n o t e b y βA the share of
4ﬁrms located in region A.W e c o n s i d e r N suﬃc i e n t l yh i g hs oa st ob ea b l et oi g n o r et h e
integer problem. Each ﬁrm incurs a ﬁx e dc o s t( w h i c hi sn o ts p e c i ﬁed since we assume that
the number of ﬁrms is exogenous) and produces a homogenous good with labor according to
a non-increasing returns to scale technology given by Y = hF(l) with F0 > 0 and F00 · 0 and
where l is the number of workers. Since our objective is to focus on the impact of matching in
t h el a b o rm a r k e t ,w ea s s u m et h a ta l lﬁrms produce the same homogeneous good and are price
takers on the goods market. Furthermore, assuming that trade between the two regional goods
markets is costless, the price of the homogenous good is the same in both regions and can be
normalized to one. With these assumptions, we rule out all interactions on the goods market
and therefore, unlike in Krugman (1991a) and Ottaviano et al. (2002), they do not inﬂuence
the location decisions of agents.1 In equilibrium, ﬁrms earn positive proﬁt s .W ea s s u m et h a t
all workers have an equal share of total proﬁts.
Each region is a linear segment with a central business district (CBD) where ﬁrms are
located and production takes place.2 Workers reside outside the city and commute to the CBD
to work. Each worker consumes one unit of land and his commuting cost is linear in the distance
travelled. We denote by t (t>0) the unit commuting cost paid in the numéraire good. This
parameter is identical in both regions. Urban costs incurred by the workers consist of land rent
and commuting cost. We assume that the land rents collected are equally distributed among
the workers. Under these assumptions, we show in the appendix that the urban cost of living
in region j incurred by a worker, C (αj), is linear in the size of the population and given by
C (αj)=tαj/4. We should note that, unlike Brueckner et al. (2002), C (αj),d o e sn o td e p e n d
on worker income. This result arises from our assumption regarding commuting cost. Since we
do not study the relationship between labor market and urban location (unlike Brueckner et
al. (2002) which analyses interactions between local labor markets and intra-urban locations
of workers but do not consider ﬁrms location choice), this assumption does not have major
consequences for our analysis. The focus of our paper is the interaction between local labor
markets and inter-regional (or inter-urban) locations of both ﬁrms and workers.
Both ﬁrms and mobile workers choose their spatial location. Firms choose their location in
1Another interpretation for this framework is that we are considering two regions in a small country for
which product prices are given.
2See Fujita and Thisse (2002) for reasons why ﬁrms want to locate in the CBD.
5function of the proﬁt they earn. The utility of workers is linear in income. We denote by αI
j
the proportion of immobile workers in each region j with αI
j ≥ 0. The presence of immobile
workers captures the fact that some individuals have exogenous characteristics which causes
them to have high mobility costs. These costs are so high that they do not move from one
region to another despite possible wage diﬀerences between the two regions.
The Labor Market
Firms and workers are located in one region only and the labor market is local. Workers
have heterogenous skills while ﬁrms are characterized by a particular technology.3 Since there is
only a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms present in the labor market, there is a degree of mismatch between
workers’ skills and ﬁrms’ skill requirements. Interaction on the labor market is modelled as in
Hamilton et al. (2000). Skill space is represented by a circle of circumference one. Each ﬁrm
and each worker has a speciﬁc position on the circle. For the worker, it represents the skills
he possesses and for the ﬁrm it represents the skill requirement of its technology. Both ﬁrms
and workers are assumed to be distributed uniformly over the circle. Only if his skills perfectly
match the ﬁrm’s technology can a worker produce output. If there is no perfect match between
the two, then the worker has to undergo a training, the cost of which he bears. The training
cost depends on the distance between the worker’s skill and the ﬁrm’s skill requirement. More
speciﬁcally, if positions of worker and ﬁrm are given by x and xi, then the training cost function
is given by s(h)|x − xi| where s(h) is the unit training cost.
The main interpretation of parameter h is the level of human capital. Following Becker
(1964), we distinguish general human capital from speciﬁc human capital. An increase in the
stock of speciﬁc human capital leads to an improvement of the worker productivity. Yet, this
increase is biased toward the task for which the worker is trained. Thus in our framework, more
speciﬁc human capital means an increase in h combined with a rise of s(h) which captures the
increasing diﬃculty for a worker to move from one task to another. An improvement in the
level of general human capital means that the worker increases his ability to perform diﬀerent
types of tasks.4 We capture such an improvement with a rise of h and a simultaneous decrease
3As shown by Stevens (1994) ﬁrms have an incentive to diﬀerentiate their skill requirements in order to
obtain market power in the labor market characterized by the heterogeneity of the workers’ skills.
4While throughout the paper we talk about “training costs”, it can represent any type of cost as, for instance,
a loss of utility associated to the mismatch.
6in s(h). The way we represent general human capital is close to Möbius and Schoenle (2006)
since a skilled worker is characterized by his ability to move from one task to another. However
unlike them, we do not consider multi-task ﬁrms.
We can also interpret h as the aggregate productivity of the economy. In that case, an
increase in h is the result of technological change. Parameter s(h) then captures the comple-
mentarity between the ﬁrm and the worker human capital. Thus, if the technological change is
skill-biased, it disproportionately improves the eﬃciency of workers who ﬁtb e s tw i t ht h eﬁrm
capital requirements. We follow here, among others, Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) or Krusell
et al. (2000) who stress that this skill bias in technological change is mainly due to an increase
in capital-skill complementarity. Therefore, such a biased technological change leads to an
increase in s(h). According to Marimon and Zilibotti (1999), such an increase in h as well as in
s(h) characterized the technological shock experienced by OECD countries in the late 1990s.
Hence, any comparative static on h can be seen according to either the technological or the
human capital view.
We assume that there is asymmetric information between workers and ﬁrms. Firms are
not able to observe workers’ positions on the circle. The only information they have is the
distribution of workers in the skill space. Therefore ﬁrms set wages that do not depend on
workers actual location on the circle/skill space. Similarly, workers do not observe the ﬁrms’
positions before choosing the region where they will be working. Workers only know the number
of ﬁrms in a particular region and form an expectation concerning the distance to the nearest
ﬁrm.
Finally, the timing of the game is the following. In a ﬁrst stage, mobile workers and ﬁrms
simultaneously choose their region. In a second stage, ﬁrms compete on the local labor markets.
In a third stage, workers locate within the region. Solving the game by backward induction, we
ﬁrst determine the location choice within the region and the land rent equilibrium. We show
in the appendix that a worker located in region j earning a wage wj net of training costs has a
net utility equal to wj − C(αj). Second, we describe the wage setting process and then study
the migration decisions and the spatial equilibria.
73R E G I O N A L W A G E S A N D P R O F I T S
Interactions on the labor market being local, regional wages and proﬁts depend on each region’s
characteristics. These characteristics are population density and number of ﬁrms, determining
jointly the region’s size. Workers base their location decisions on the expected wage. This
expected wage depends on gross wage and expected training cost. Firms infer the proﬁtt h e y
will obtain in each region based on that region’s population and number of ﬁrms. Consider
a ﬁrm i in region j (j = A,B) located in the skill space at xi. The labor supply to ﬁrm i
depends on its own wage wi as well as on wages wi−1 and wi+1 set by adjacent ﬁrms. Denote
by b x (resp. b y) the workers indiﬀerent between working in ﬁrm i or in ﬁrm i − 1 (resp. in ﬁrm
i or in ﬁrm i +1 ). This implies that the labor supply to ﬁrm i is given by:












Hence proﬁt is given by (for ease of notation we use li for li (wi,w i−1,w i+1))
πi = hF (li) − wili (2)













This expression gives the eﬀect of a change in the ﬁrm’s own wage on its labor supply. The
higher the population density, the smaller the wage increase needed to increase the labor supply
to the ﬁrm. We focus here on the symmetric Nash equilibrium, that is an equilibrium where
ﬁrms are equidistant6 and where wi = w. Given symmetrically located ﬁrms on the circle, the











5It is easily established that the SOC is always veriﬁed.
6Following Economides (1989) and Kats (1995), the equidistant conﬁguration of locations on the circle is
likely to be an equilibrium outcome of a game in which ﬁrms choose their technologies prior to setting their
wages. In our case, this has to be considered as an approximation. Allowing for asymmetric ﬁrm locations
would only complicate computations without modifying the results.
8The equilibrium wage equals marginal productivity of labor (the wage that would prevail
with perfect competition on the labor market) given by hF0 (αA/βAN) minus a term s/βAN
which can be interpreted as the impact of imperfect competition on the labor market. In
this model, imperfect competition results from imperfect matching between ﬁrms and workers.
Firms beneﬁt from such an imperfection: because workers cannot move to another ﬁrm at zero
cost, ﬁrms can set wages lower than marginal productivity. Consequently, the higher the unit
training cost s, the greater the oligopsonic power of the ﬁrm and the lower its wage. This
oligopsonic power is however reduced by the number of ﬁrms in the region: an increase in
the number of ﬁrms in a region reduces the cost for a worker to move to another ﬁrm. This
intensiﬁes competition between ﬁrms, and thus pushes the equilibrium wage up. The wage is
also positively related to the number of ﬁrms through the impact of the number of ﬁrms on
marginal productivity. Finally, expression (3) shows that an increase in the density of workers
pushes wages down. As the density of workers increases, the number of workers a ﬁrm employs
increases and the marginal productivity decreases because of diminishing returns. Consider a
worker not yet located in a region. This worker only knows the number of ﬁrms located in that
region but, beforehand, he does not know exactly the skill distance to the ﬁrm where he will
be employed. If he expects ﬁrms to be symmetrically located on the circle, his net expected
wage is the gross wage net of expected training cost E(TC):
wA (αA,βA)=wA (αA,βA) − E(TC)













Here again, the net expected wage increases as the number of ﬁrms within the region increases.
However, here the eﬀect of βA is stronger than it is for the worker who perfectly matches the
skill needs of a ﬁrm since it also takes into account the eﬀect on the training costs that the
workers incur. Using equations (2) and (3), the equilibrium proﬁti sg i v e nb y




94 MIGRATION EQUILIBRIA AND SPATIAL DYNAM-
ICS
The previous section described wages and proﬁts for given agents’ locations. Since ﬁrms and
mobile workers can move from one region to another, these locations are endogenous. We start
by looking at location decisions for each agent separately and then analyze how the interaction
of the migration behavior of the two types of agents yields the location equilibria.
Migration Equilibria
Firms. Firms’ location choice is driven by the diﬀerence between proﬁte a r n e di nr e g i o nA
a n dt h a te a r n e di nr e g i o nB. This comparison is given by the following expression:7
∆π(αA,βA)=πA (αA,βA) − πB (αB,βB)










Two forces inﬂuence ﬁrms’ location choice, a “market size eﬀect” and a “competition eﬀect”.
In our setting, the relevant market size for a ﬁrm is the number of workers per ﬁrm denoted by
li. Ceteris paribus, ﬁrms are induced to locate where the number of workers per ﬁrm is larger:
we have ∂∆π/∂lA > 0 and ∂∆π/∂lB < 0. Hence, whenever lA >l B, that is whenever region
A is larger than region B in terms of workers per ﬁrm, ﬁrms want to locate in region A.T h i s
force plays towards convergence of regions. Market power, on the contrary, leads ﬁrms to avoid
locating in the region where the number of ﬁrms is larger. Ceteris paribus, whenever βA > βB,
ﬁrms choose to locate in region B (for given lA and lB, ∂∆π/∂βA < 0 and ∂∆π/∂βB > 0):
competition is a dispersion force.
Since ∂∆π(αA,βA)/∂βA is diﬀerent from zero, there exists a well deﬁned function M(αA)
that gives for any density of workers αA,t h es h a r eo fﬁrms in region A (βA) such that proﬁts








The intuition behind this result is the following. Consider the following comparative static
along curve M, starting from a point on this curve where region A is the large region, i.e.
αA > 1/2. If the number of workers in region A increases, because of the market size eﬀect,
7Note that ∆π (αA,βA) is a function of only αA and βA since βB =1− βA and αB =1− αA.
10region B becomes less attractive for ﬁrms since lA increases while lB decreases. Thus, in order
to maintain indiﬀerence between both regions, the number of ﬁrms located in region B must
be lower. In addition, the market size in region B (the ratio lB) must decrease. If ratios lB
and lA would remain unchanged, region B w o u l db em o r ea t t r a c t i v et h a nr e g i o nA because of
less competition and unchanged market size. Hence, for αA > 1/2,a ni n c r e a s ei nt h en u m b e r
of workers in region A leads to a continuous decrease of lB (= αB/NβB). Note moreover that
whenever region A is the larger region, the curve is located below the 45 degree line. Indeed,
tougher competition (βA > βB)m u s tb eo ﬀset by a larger market size (lA >l B). This also
implies that the ﬁrm size must be larger in the larger region.
Figure 1 represents function M relating the labor force αA of region A (X-axis) with the
share of ﬁrms in that region βA (Y-axis). The curve is symmetric with respect to point
(1/2,1/2).F o r αA > 1/2, any increase in the ratio s(h)/N magniﬁes the competition force
relative to the market size eﬀect and thus pushes the curve lower since ﬁrms’ agglomeration
increases.
Workers. Location decisions by mobile workers involve comparing net expected income
in each region. The net expected income is given by net expected wage minus the region’s
urban cost. Indeed, since the share of proﬁt a worker obtains is independent of his location,
he bases his location decision on the expected wage diﬀerence. The reason for considering the
expected wage is that before making his decision the worker only knows the number of ﬁrms
in a particular region. He forms an expectation about his skill distance to the nearest ﬁrm.
The diﬀerence between the net expected wage obtained in region A a n dt h a ti nr e g i o nB,i n
addition to the urban cost diﬀerence gives us:




































Three diﬀerent forces drive workers location choice: a “competition force” (agglomeration force)
as well as a “market size eﬀect” and a “congestion force” (dispersion forces). Consider each of
these forces in turn. Because of non-increasing returns, ceteris-paribus, workers are induced to
locate where the number of workers relative to the number of ﬁrms is smaller. A si nt h ec a s eo f
11ﬁrms, this force encourages convergence of regions in terms of li. Congestion costs lead workers
to locate in the smaller region in terms of workers and thus constitute a dispersion force. As
ﬁrms agglomerate in region A, the wage diﬀerence increases; tough competition on the labor
market is an agglomeration force for workers. Stated diﬀerently, imperfect matching on the
labor market confers market power to ﬁrms and leads workers to move to the region where
a larger number of ﬁrms are located. Since ∂∆w(αA,βA)/∂βA is diﬀerent from zero, there
exists a function G(αA) that gives for any density of workers αA,t h es h a r eo fﬁrms in region A









Indeed, if the number of workers becomes larger in region A, because of both the market
size eﬀect and the congestion force, workers prefer locating in region B. So as to restore the
indiﬀerence, the number of ﬁrms in B must be lower. However, because of the congestion force,
there is no reason for the ratio lB to fall. Thus, a priori, curve G could be either concave or
convex. Graphically, this gives us the curve G represented on Figure 1.8
8G does not reach point (1,1). Indeed, as the number of ﬁrms goes to zero in one region, oligopsonic power
becomes inﬁnite. Thus workers never locate in a region if the number of ﬁrms tends to zero.
12Figure 1
For αA > 1/2, any increase in t increases the congestion force relative to the market size
force and pushes the curve up while any increase in the ratio s(h)/N magniﬁes the competition
force relative to the market size force and pushes the curve down.
Spatial Equilibria. In order to get the spatial distribution of economic activity, we must deal
with the location decisions of both types of agents. An (interior) equilibrium is characterized
by:
∆w(αA,βA)=0 and ∆π(αA,βA)=0
There always exists a “symmetric equilibrium” where αA = αB =1 /2 and βA = βB =
1/2. Moreover, the preceding section showed that the position of both curves depends on
the ratio s(h)/N whereas the position of the curve of workers depends also on t. Hence, if
commuting cost t is low (more precisely if t<t (h,s(h),N)),9 then, in addition to the symmetric
9t
¯
as well as ¯ ta r ed e ﬁned in the appendix.
13equilibrium, the “agglomeration” outcomes are also equilibria. In Figure 1, this conﬁguration
corresponds to point F (F’) when some workers are immobile and 0 (0’) when all workers are
mobile. In this case the equilibria are characterised by ∆π (αA,βA)=0and ∆w(αA,βA) >
(<)0. The reason is that both ﬁrms and workers ﬁnd it better to locate where other agents
are located: ﬁrms accept to locate close to other ﬁrms and face stronger competition provided
that the market is suﬃciently large. This is guaranteed by the fact that workers, in order to
obtain higher wages and because of low urban costs, want to locate where most ﬁrms are. If,
on the contrary, commuting cost t is extremely high (t>t(h,s(h),N)), then the symmetrical
outcome is the only equilibrium (In Figure 1, this would be a curve G above curve M for any
αA > 1/2). In this case, both agents want to avoid locating in a large region: workers want
t oa v o i dh i g hu r b a nc o s t sa n dﬁrms want to avoid competition since this is not compensated
by a larger market. For intermediate values of t, i.e. t(h,s(h),N) <t<t(h,s(h),N),t h e r e
are three types of equilibria: the “full” agglomeration equilibria, the symmetrical outcome and
the intermediate agglomeration (the conﬁguration represented in Figure 1). This last type
of equilibrium is an “asymmetric-interior” distribution of both ﬁrms and workers at points I
and I0. Firms and workers are agglomerated within one region but, this agglomeration is not
complete: some mobile workers and ﬁrms remain located in the other region. At points I and
I0,g i v e nt, the asymmetric distribution of mobile workers between the two regions guarantees
that the two net expected incomes are identical in both regions. In the larger region, a higher
net expected wage due to stronger competition between ﬁr m si sc o m p e n s a t e db yl a r g e ru r b a n
costs. We should note here that the uniqueness of points I and I0 is guaranteed if curve G is
concave and M is convex.
Spatial Dynamics
Since we have multiple equilibria, the equilibrium that will be selected depends both on
initial conditions as well as adjustment speeds of both types of agents. For simplicity, we focus
in this section on the case where point I is unique. However, similar spatial dynamics can be
established in the more general case. To start with, let us assume that both agents will move
to the region with the highest current payoﬀ. Initial distributions of workers and ﬁrms that,
independently of adjustment speeds, always lead the economy to the symmetrical outcome S,
are contained in the rectangle whose corners are given by intermediate agglomeration points I
and I0 (Figure 2). The size of this rectangle depends on the parameters of the model. Any policy
14that increases the size of this rectangle increases the probability that regions converge. However,
the points within this “S-box” are not the only initial conditions that lead the economy to the
S outcome. In order to identify all the initial conditions that will lead to S we need to make
assumptions on the migrating behavior and adjustment speeds of the two types of agents. We
assume the following functional forms for the migration functions:
˙ αA =

   
   
µ(∆w(αA,βA)) > 0 if ∆w(αA,βA) > 0 and αA < 1 − αI
B
0 if either ∆w(αA,βA)=0or if ∆w(αA,βA) 6=0and αA < αI
A or 1 − αI
B < αA





   
   
υ(∆π(αA,βA)) > 0 if ∆π(αA,βA) > 0 and βA < 1
0 if ∆π(αA,βA) > 0 and βA =1or ∆π(αA,βA) < 0 and βA =0or ∆π(αA,βA)=0
υ(∆π(αA,βA)) < 0 if ∆π(αA,βA) < 0 and 0 < βA
(8)
where functions µ and υ are assumed non-decreasing and continuous.
Note that here we are assuming that agents have myopic expectations and take decisions
in function of current values only. This means that only history matters. It is a common
assumption in this type of models. Another possibility would be to assume that agents have
forward-looking expectations.10 At the end of this section, we discuss what the implications
could be if workers were to have forward-looking expectations.
For our analysis we focus on the case where there are ﬁve diﬀerent spatial equilibria which
corresponds to the situation where t has an intermediate value, G is concave and M is convex.
In the appendix, we show, that equilibria F and F0 as well as equilibrium S are stable. Points I
and I0, on the contrary, are saddlepoints. The two stable paths associated with the saddlepoints
divide the complete space of initial conditions into three basins of attraction, one for each
stable equilibrium. Besides the elements that determine the size of the “S-box”, the size of
each basin of attraction also depends on the relative adjustment speeds of the agents. This
can be explained as follows. The critical size threshold above which a region converges to
10For a summary of this issue, see Krugman (1991b), Fukao and Benabou (1993) and Baldwin (2001).
15full agglomeration depends on the population and the number of ﬁrms. However, the relative
importance of these two elements in determining the threshold is a function of the speeds of
adjustment: at given adjustment speed of workers, the greater the speed of adjustment of ﬁrms,
the less important is the number of ﬁrms. Consider point J in Figure 2. Since this point is at
the right of ¯ α, the economy would be completely agglomerated if ﬁrms’ adjustment speeds were
inﬁnite. But, whenever there is some inertia in their location decisions, the combined dynamics
lead the economy to a completely diﬀerent outcome, namely the symmetrical equilibrium. The
explanation is the following. At point J, workers of region A have an incentive to move to
region B because the number of ﬁr m si sn o ts u ﬃciently large. At the same time, there is an
entry of ﬁrms in region A because the number of workers there is large. If ﬁrms’ adjustment
speed is suﬃciently important, a threshold will be reached where the mass of ﬁrms in region
A is important enough to attract workers to region A again. If not, then on the contrary,
another threshold will be reached in terms of population size such that ﬁrms no longer want
to move into region A. The impact of diﬀerent adjustment speeds of agents on the selection of
the spatial equilibrium suggests that countries which have initially similar regional asymmetries
could experience very diﬀerent outcomes. Starting from J, a country like the US might end
up in point S while the EU might reach point F.P o i n t J for a country like the US, where
workers’ mobility is high, might not be in the basin of attraction of point F, thus ending up
at point S while for the EU, where typically workers are less mobile (Bentivogli and Pagano,
1999), it might, on the contrary, be in the basin of attraction of point F.
16Figure 2
Our model’s main result is the existence of a size diﬀerence threshold: initial regional
size asymmetries greater than this threshold (α or β for extreme adjustment speeds) result
in agglomeration of agents in one region through a self-reinforcing process. Public policy
changes regional outcomes by modifying this threshold’s level: the higher it is, the less likely
the economy converges towards full agglomeration. It also shows why with strong diﬀerences
in adjustment speeds of diﬀerent agents, the same public policy has in some cases a limited
impact while in other cases the eﬀect will be dramatic.
Until now we assumed that agents moved in function of current wage diﬀerences. Myopic
dynamics give only a partial picture of what dynamics could be. How would our results change
if agents adopt a forward-looking behavior and made their decisions in function of future
values? For simplicity, let us assume that the production function is linear and that ﬁrms
adjust themselves instantaneously. As before, if t<t (h,s(h),N), then only the symmetrical
and two agglomeration points are equilibria. If t is very low, rendering the large region more
attractive, then expectations can play if regions are initially not too diﬀerent in size. For
17instance, a trajectory where the initial larger region becomes the smaller is consistent with
rational expectations. If t is higher, then expectations do not play any role and the initially
larger region eventually attracts all activity whereas whenever regions are quite similar the
economy converges toward the symmetric equilibrium. Indeed, it would be too costly for
workers to move toward one region even if they all expect that region to become larger in the
future. If t>t(h,s(h),N)), then there are ﬁve equilibria possible. Here again, if t is not too
high, adjustment costs and discount factor are low, expectations can play a role if the regions
are neither too diﬀerent nor too similar in size.
5 PUBLIC POLICIES AND REGIONAL OUTCOME
The previous section showed that agents’ location decisions depend on three parameters: level
of urban cost, share of immobile workers and level of human capital. In this section, we show
how changes in these parameters inﬂuence the stability and the existence of diﬀerent spatial
equilibria. In doing so, we are able to examine the impact of diﬀerent types of mobility,
mobility within regions, mobility between regions and mobility on the labor market,o nr e g i o n a l
disparities as well as on social welfare. Hence our main question: For each type of mobility,
will its improvement increase or decrease the likelihood of agglomeration?
We show that any improvement of spatial mobility is likely to increase regional disparities
whereas improving mobility on the labor market is likely to reduce such disparities.
Workers’ Spatial Mobility
Spatial mobility has two dimensions: mobility between and within regions. Increasing mo-
bility within regions unambiguously magniﬁes the agglomeration process. A fall in commuting
cost t decreases the magnitude of the congestion force. Thus, for any t<t, the agglomerated
equilibrium always exists. For values below t, the economy is likely to fully agglomerate.
Similarly if more workers are mobile between regions, agglomeration becomes more likely.
Consider point K in ﬁgure 2. Two cases are illustrated. If the number of immobile workers
in region B is large (upper boundary left of ¯ α), then the economy always converges toward
the symmetrical equilibrium. The reason is that given the large number of immobile workers
in B,r e g i o nA, initially larger and with higher wages, will lose ﬁrms since it will never be
able to reach a suﬃciently important market size to compensate ﬁrms for a higher degree of
18competition. If the number of immobile workers in region B is small (upper boundary right
of α), the economy is likely to converge toward agglomeration if the initial size of region A is
suﬃciently large. As in other models, high interregional mobility allows one region to attract
as u ﬃcient number of workers to sustain agglomeration.
Education and Spatial Equilibria
In our model, an improvement in the education of workers takes the form of an increase in
the level of human capital h. Such a policy has a direct positive impact on the productivity
of workers as well as an indirect impact on the degree of specialization of workers, which is
measured by the term s(h). There are two possibilities: an increase in the level of human
capital can make workers either less (s0(h) < 0)o rm o r e( s0(h) > 0) specialized. We show that
the impact of education on regional disparities depends crucially on its eﬀect on specialization:
increasing the level of human capital increases the incentives for workers to agglomerate and
increases the size of the basin of attraction of agglomeration equilibria only if it leads to more
specialization.
Consider the case with immobile workers in region B and agglomeration in region A (point
F in Figure 1). A change in the level of human capital modiﬁe st h er e l a t i v ei m p o r t a n c eo f
forces (competition, congestion and market size force) working in diﬀerent directions. Assume
to start with that h has no inﬂuence on s(h). Then, an increase in h increases, relative to
both competition and congestion forces, the importance of the market size force, which, be-
cause of the productivity diﬀerence tends to lead to a convergence of the ﬁrms per worker
ratio (∂∆π/∂h|∆π=0 < 0). In the same way, incentives for workers to agglomerate are reduced
(∂∆w/∂h|∆w=0 < 0). If h has a negative impact on s(h), the same remains true and the
dispersion eﬀect is even reinforced since the competition force plays a smaller role. Conse-
quently, if the increase in h is suﬃciently large, ceteris paribus, the agglomerated equilibrium
no longer exists.11 In that case, the threshold α increases so that the basin of attraction of the
agglomerated equilibrium becomes smaller, thereby decreasing the likelihood of the economy
converging to this equilibrium.12 We should note here that the negative impact of h on s(h)
increases competition and thus reduces the wage mark-up.
11Indeed, according to equation (6) a decrease in s has a similar impact as an increase in t.
12When the agglomeration force decreases, curve G rotates counter-clockwise. There exists an s such that G
is fully above the 45 degree line and point I no longer exists. Thus by continuity, α increases.
19On the other hand, if specialization increases following an increase of h (s0(h) > 0), the
magnitude of the competition force increases: ﬁrms are more sensitive to competition and thus
are induced to locate where the number of ﬁrms is lower, whereas as competition on the labor
market weakens, workers’ incentives to agglomerate within the larger region increase. Hence,
if s0 (h) > 0,a ni n c r e a s ei nh generates two opposing forces: one based on productivity diﬀer-
ences encouraging dispersion and another one based on labor market competition encouraging
agglomeration of workers. In that case, education policy reduces competition on the labor
market and thus increases the wage mark-up.
Therefore, the impact of an increase in human capital depends crucially on its eﬀect on spe-
cialization. A decrease in specialization unambiguously fosters dispersion while a specialization
increase is likely to lead to more agglomeration.
An education policy will be able to reduce regional disparities if it reduces workers’ special-
ization. In other words, to reduce regional disparities, general training, which makes workers
more mobile between tasks, is to be preferred to speciﬁc training. This point can be illustrated
with experiences of countries like the Czech Republic and Poland. The existence of education
structures leading to a workforce which was too specialized was seen as a major barrier to
their development. Recently, these countries have tried to make vocational programs more
general (Gill et al., 2000). Moreover, a recent study on French micro data (Drapier and Jayet,
2003) on spatial mobility of young workers supports our results. Indeed, the authors show
that young low-skill and very specialized workers move much more than high-skill and less
specialized workers. The authors explain this observation by the fact that skill mismatch is
much more common among low-skill than among the high-skill workers. Going back to Figure
2, this might be another reason why a country like the US is more likely to end up at point
S than the EU: in the US the focus is more on general education while in the EU the focus
is more on vocational education (speciﬁc human capital) (Krueger and Kumar 2004; Wasmer
2006).
If we follow our technological interpretation of parameter h, an increase in h is seen as
technological progress. In that case, according to our previous discussion, we show that a
biased technological progress that reinforces complementarity between skilled workers and ﬁrms
is likely to lead to spatial agglomeration.
Martin (1999) and Matouschek and Robert-Nicoud (2005) are examples of a few existing
20economic geography models which introduce human capital. Although we are using a diﬀerent
approach, our main conclusion on the impact of education improvement on regional disparities
is in line with Martin (1999). He shows that an increase in the researchers’ productivity reduces
regional inequality by inducing more entry on the goods market. Our results are somewhat
diﬀerent than those of Matouschek and Robert-Nicoud (2004). In a model with endogenous
investment in human capital, they show that if workers have the possibility to invest only in
industry-speciﬁc human capital, they are likely to agglomerate while if the only possibility
is ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital, dispersion is more likely. With pure industry-speciﬁch u m a n
capital, their results depend on the assumption that there are only two ﬁrms. If human capital
is industry-speciﬁc, both ﬁrms no longer have market power if they both locate in the same
region whereas spatial dispersion confers monopoly power to each ﬁrm. In our model, the
magnitude of oligopsonic power depends on both the speciﬁcity of human capital as well as
on the number of ﬁrms. And in our case, we show that the less industry-speciﬁc (the more
ﬁrm-speciﬁc) the human capital, the more likely is the agglomerated equilibrium.
Finally, what can be said regarding the welfare impact of an education policy? To analyze
this, we use a simple measure of total welfare. In this economy with only one ﬁnal good, a
natural measure of welfare is given by total production minus total training cost and the urban

































Education improvement has two distinct eﬀects on aggregate welfare. For unchanged agents
location, a decrease in s or an increase in h has a positive impact on welfare. However, as
13Indeed, because of inelastic labor supply and housing demand, and the existence of only one consumption
good, utility increases with output. As a result, total production is an utilitarian measure of welfare: if
total production increases, there are individual transfers that ensure that all proﬁts and all individual utilities
increase.
21explained above, an education policy is also likely to modify the spatial equilibrium of the
economy.
It is impossible to give general conclusions regarding which spatial equilibrium, S or F,
dominates in terms of welfare. The welfare ranking of these two points depends on the speciﬁc
parameter values. Point S dominates point F in terms of total production because of non-
increasing returns and in terms of large urban costs while point F leads to lower total training
costs even though immobile workers remaining in the small region face higher training costs.
Ah i g h e rh,al o w e rs, and a higher t make it more likely that point S dominates point F in
terms of welfare and vice versa.
From our previous discussion of the eﬀect of an increase in h on spatial equilibrium, we
know that the nature of the education policy is of crucial importance for the spatial outcome. If
the objective is to avoid strong regional inequalities where most economic activity is located in
one region, an education policy which increases not only worker productivity but also renders
workers more mobile between tasks should be favored. This reduces incentives for workers to
agglomerate in the large region to avoid ﬁrms’ market power and hence reduces the likelihood
of an agglomerated outcome. An education policy rendering workers less mobile between tasks
would have the opposite eﬀect. If we analyze the two types of education policies in terms of their
welfare impact, results are less clear-cut. An education policy rendering workers more mobile
between tasks, makes the symmetrical outcome more likely and also increases the likelihood of
S being better in terms of welfare. The second type of education policy makes the agglomerated
outcome F more likely, but it also reduces the likelihood that S dominates in terms of welfare.
The explanation for this result is that agents partly internalize the impact of a change in h or
s in their location decisions. However, we cannot exclude the fact that the spatial outcome is
the dominated spatial equilibrium. For workers, the private beneﬁt of agglomeration is higher
than the social beneﬁt since they are induced to escape from market power whereas for ﬁrms,
for the same reason, the private beneﬁt of dispersion is higher than the social beneﬁt( a tp o i n t
F,w eh a v et h a t∂W/∂βA > 0).
Finally, although we modelled a public education policy simply as an exogenous increase in
parameter h, this can be modelled explicitly. One possible approach is to adopt the framework
proposed in De la croix and Michel (2005). Individuals have the choice to spend their wages
either on consumption or on education. By taxing wages and spending tax revenue on edu-
22cation, prices are distorted in such a way that individuals are incited to spend more on their
education and hence accumulate more human capital.
Human Capital and Spatial Mobility
Until now we assumed exogenously that some workers were mobile while others were not.
Similar results are obtained if all individuals are geographically mobile, i.e. αI
A = αI
B =0 ,
but their incentives to relocate vary with their level of human capital. Assume two types of
workers: αE educated workers of type E with human capital hE and αU unskilled workers of
type U with human capital hU,w i t hhE >h U and αE+αU =1 . For simplicity, assume that the
production function is separable in worker type, that there are constant marginal productivities
and we focus here on the case where s(h) increases with h.I nt h a tc a s e ,c u r v eI ’ S I( IESI0E)
gives the distribution of workers and ﬁrms between the two regions such that U-type (E-type)
workers are indiﬀerent between the two locations. With this production function speciﬁcation,
the regional wage depends only on the number of workers located in the region and not on
the distribution of diﬀerent types of workers. This means that as discussed in section 5.2, the
exact position of each curve depends on the level of h. In addition to points 0, S, and 0’,
the existence of other equilibria depends on the number of each worker type. With a small
number of U-type workers (and hence a large number of E-type workers), point IE (I0E)i s
an equilibrium in which all U-type workers agglomerate in the large region; If this number is
large, point I (I’) is an equilibrium in which not all but most U-types agglomerate in the large
region; If the shares of both types of workers are not too diﬀerent, both IE (I0E)a n dI( I ’ )a r e
equilibria.
This brief consideration of two worker types with diﬀerent levels of human capital improves
our understanding of the interaction between level of human capital and location decisions.
We show that the unskilled workers are those who are the most induced to agglomerate to
avoid market power from ﬁrms since any kind of agglomerated equilibrium consists of the
agglomeration of the unskilled. In that sense the unskilled workers are “more mobile”. An
increase in the urban cost leads to a counter-clockwise rotation around point S of the two
Gc u r v e s . T h ei n t u i t i o nf o rt h i si st h a tf o rαA > 1/2, if urban costs are higher, at a given
distribution of total population between the two regions, both types of workers would only be
willing to stay in the large region if there are higher wages. This means that both points I
and IE move towards 0’. The result is that for a given total number of U-type workers, the
23complete agglomeration of all U-type workers in the large region is more likely. Higher urban
costs require attracting more ﬁrms, which itself is only possible if the large region is bigger in
terms of population. The increase in size of the larger region allows a bigger share of U-type
workers, who have the most incentives to locate in the large region, to agglomerate.
6C O N C L U S I O N
We show in this paper how labor market imperfection due to human capital speciﬁcity can give
rise to regional disparities. The speciﬁcity of human capital gives oligopsony power to ﬁrms.
W o r k e r st h u sh a v ei n c e n t i v e st om o v et or e g i o n sw h e r eal a r g en u m b e ro fﬁrms are located
while ﬁrms beneﬁt from large labor markets. We identify a regional size diﬀerence threshold
above which regional disparities will emerge.
In this framework, we show that a policy which increases workers’ mobility between jobs
or tasks, increases competition on the labor market and thus makes workers less likely to
move from the less to the most populated region. This suggests that if regional equality is
the objective, not all types of education policies are suited: only those policies which increase
workers’ labor market mobility decrease the probability of regional disparity.
7 APPENDIX
Urban Cost
As in Brueckner at al. (2002) or Fujita and Thisse (2002), the utility of a worker within a
region j with a mass of αj workers is determined as follows. We deﬁne z as the numéraire good
consumed by workers. Denoting by R(x) the rent per unit of land located at a distance x from
the CBD and considering a worker that has a wage (net of training costs) equal to w located
at a distance x from the CBD, the budget constraint is: R(x)+tx+z = w. Thus the bid-rent
is given by R(x)=w − z − tx. Considering without loss of generality that the opportunity
cost of land is zero, the rent at the fringe of the city (x = αj/2) is zero: R(αj/2) = 0. Hence
z = w − t(αj/2). We assume that all the land rents are collected and equally redistributed
among the workers of the region. Consequently, individual urban costs after redistribution of
land rents are equal to tαj/4.
24Functions M(αA) and G(αA)
We start by showing that both functions are increasing and then show the convexity of
M(αA) in general and the concavity of G(αA) in special cases. We set F00





























































































The analysis of the functions is for αA ≥ 1/2. Properties for αA < 1/2 can easily be deduced
by symmetry.
Convexity of M(αA) Function M is convex if and only if ratio lB changes monotonically





















which always true since lA >l B, Φ0 > Φ and Ψ0 > Ψ.
Concavity of G(αA) While analytical proofs for the properties of G(αA) for general F are
complicated, it is easily shown numerically that G has the required properties for a large number
of speciﬁc functional forms and analytically when the production function is linear, i.e. hF(l)=














for any αA > 1/2.
Existence of Equilibria (Points I and F)
We deﬁne P(t,αA)=G(t,αA) − M(αA) where G(t,αA) ≡ G(αA). Since this expression is
symmetrical with respect to αA =1 /2,w eh a v eP(t,αA)=−P(t,1 − αA) and any properties
of the function for αA ≥ 1/2 can be derived by symmetry for αA · 1/2.
25Function P(t,αA) has the following properties:
Property 1 P(t,αA) is continuous and increasing in t: For any αA, we have ∂∆w/∂t<0
and ∂∆w/∂βA > 0 which implies ∂G/∂t>0.
Property 2 P(0,αA) < 0 for any αA > 1/2:A l o n gc u r v eM, ∆π =( F(lA) − lAwA) −
(F(lB) − lBwB)=0 . This curve is below the 45-degree line, thus lA >l B. Moreover, F(l)−wl
decreases with w and increases with l since w<F 0(l). Thus if F(lA) − wAlA = F(lB) − wBlB
and lA >l B, necessarily, wA >w B. Hence, G,w h e r ewA = wB, is below M.
Property 3 There exists t such that for any t>t, P(t,αA) > 0 for any 1 > αA > 1/2.U s -
ing (6) and considering points (αA,βA) on the 45-degree line, i.e. βA/αA =( 1− βA)/(1 − αA),
t h e r ea l w a y se x i s t sat such that ∆w<0. This means that G is above the 45-degree line and
since M is always below this line, we have G − M>0. We note that for t inﬁnite, if αA tends
to 1, G(αA) tends to 1: the curve goes to the corner of the box.
Property 4 There exists t such that for any t<t ,P (t,αA) < 0 for any αA > 1/2:T h i s
property is a consequence of properties 1 to 3.
Property 5 For t <t<t, there exists α such that P(t,α)=0 : This property is a
consequence of properties 1 to 4. The point which satisﬁes P(t,α)=0is denoted by I
with coordinates ¯ α and β.W h e n f u n c t i o n G(αA) is concave, this point is unique. Since
P0(αA =1 /2) > 0 and P(αA =1 )< 0,w eh a v eP0(¯ α) < 0 which implies that G0(¯ α) <M 0(¯ α).
Equilibria Stability
The equations of motion are given by (7) and (8) where functions µ and υ are assumed
non-decreasing and continuous. Stability of the diﬀerent equilibria is determined by looking
at the Jacobian matrix J of the system of equations given by (7) and (8) if both functions
are continuous. We thus use this approach to establish the stability properties of S and I,
and use a graphical argument to establish the stability of F.S u ﬃcient conditions for a stable
equilibrium are that |J| > 0 and trace tr(J) < 0 while for a saddle point, it is suﬃcient that
|J| < 0.
Proof: Since ∂∆w/∂αA < 0 we have that ∂ ˙ αA/∂αA = µ0 (∆w(αA,βA))∂∆w/∂αA · 0
and since ∂∆π/∂βA < 0 we have that ∂
.
βA/∂βA = υ0 (∆π (αA,βA))∂∆π/∂βA · 0.T h e s et w o
elements imply that tr(J)=∂ ˙ αA/∂αA + ∂
.
βA/∂βA < 0. In addition, we have ∂ ˙ αA/∂βA =
µ0 (∆w(αA,βA))∂∆w/∂βA and ∂
.
βA/∂αA = υ0 (∆π(αA,βA))∂∆π/∂αA. Combining these











































The terms outside the brackets being negative, we have sign {|J|} =s i g n{(G0/M 0) − 1}.
Point S At point S, G0 >M 0 ⇒ |J| > 0.
Point I At point I, G0 <M 0 ⇒ |J| < 0.
Points F Points are stable according to a graphical argument.
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